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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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"The increasing visibility of the Soviet Navy during the sixties 
was largely a function of its progressive shift to forward 
deployment, but at the same time building programs for both the 
submarine and surface forces were also gradually changing its 
structure. These programs were by no means all carried out on 
a smoothly-meshed and uninterupted basis; indeed they seemed 
prone to a more-than-average quota of reconfigurations, backfitting, 
and other readjustments. Whether this was primarily due to internal 
technological factors and institutional hassling over resources 
and mission priorities or to the impact of external developments 
and threat reappraisals, is not clear. On the whole, however, it 
seems fair to say that there was a reasonably coherent pattern of 
pursuring the main trend set in the late fifties toward incorporating 
missile technology in submarines and relatively small but fast 
surface units ranging from patrol boats at one end of the spectrum 
to cruisers of up to about 7500 tons at the other." 
Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Naval Interaction With the United States and it's 
influence on Soviet Naval Development." (Rand Corporation-Oct 1972) 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: With the strong rise' of a modern Soviet Navy in the past decade 
and the increased obsolescence of many of our naval vessels, some built in World 
War II, the urgent need for a well-balanced ship construction program has become 
a priority issue for the Navy. In a recent meeting of the American Society of 
Naval Engineers Vice Admiral Frank H. Price, Jr., USN, Director of the Ship 
Acquisition & Improvement Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations gave 
a_luncheon address which outlined this modernization program. 
FEATURE~ LUNCHEON ADDRESS: OUR NAVY NEEDS SHIPS 
The ultimate objective of all of us is to acquire the ships that the Fleet needs 
so badly in order that it can carry out its mission-both now and in the future. There 
are many factors which today are acting to shape what the Fleet should be. Each of 
us tends to perceive the final result somewhat differently depending on his own 
perspective. 
I am sure that you recall the story of how an elephant appeared to a group of blind 
men depending on what feature of the elephant each happened to address and how each 
was influenced by his own past experience with animals. A similar phenomenon results 
when we attempt to formulate and build ships today-we have proponents for everything 
from mice to elephants whether they be pink, white or battleship grey. Our job, yours 
and mine, is to develop alternatives from which the Chief of Naval Operations can 
select the required characteristics and capabilities of the ships we should have, 
and then to support the programs and build the ships-SHIPS THAT THE NAVY SO BADLY 
NEEDS. 
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There are many problems involved in carrying out these tasks. The resources 
available for building ships have never been and never will be large enough to 
take care of all of our "druthers". Also, we are now deep in the midst of a 
particularly serious problem. In 1969, the average age of our Fleet had risen 
to about 18 years, and it was still growing. This meant that a great majority of 
our ships were reaching retirement age, and even though we had been building new 
ships as fast as the Ship Construction Navy (SCN) Budget would allow, WE WERE 
GETTING NOWHERE. 
It was obvious that WE HAD TO DO SOMETHING AND SOON I It was just as obvious 
that we had to do something different from what we had been doing. IF THIS 
INCREASING AGE TREND WAS NOT CHECKED, WE WOULD SOON BE WITHOUT AN EFFECTIVE NAVY. 
The General Purpose Ships that we had built in the late fifties, and throughout 
the sixties, and now in the early seventies, were sophisticated and highly capable, 
BUT THEY WERE EXPENSIVE. They are fine ships-our Submarines, DDG's, DLG's, and 
CVA's. We also had modernized our Amphibious Force with modern LPH's, LPD's, LKA's, 
LCC's, and LST's; bringing it into the 20 knot, vertical envelopment world, and we 
also had given some help to the Service Forces with the new AOE's, AOR's, and AE's. 
However, even with this, the AGE TREND WAS STILL UPWARD, and the bulk of our surface 
combatants was rapidly approaching obsolescence. 
During this same period, several factors had emerged which "tilted our windmills". 
FIRST, the SOVIET NAVY had been conducting a vigorous and well orchestrated construction 
program producing a modern capable NAVY-one that could not be ignored. SECOND, our 
dependence on the SEA LANES has been increasing. Our need to import energy, as you 
have no doubt read in our media, is increasing at a rapid rate, and in order to meet 
this and other urgent needs we must be able to insure ourselves free use of the seas. 
THIRDLY, there was a strong desire to shift our NATIONAL PRIORITIES away from the 
military and into other sectors. Realistically, we had to face up to the fact that 
we would have level or decreasing budgets, certainly if the effects of inflation are 
factored in. 
Thus, we were facing a dilemma of major proportions. In spite of the money we 
had been able to spend in the recent past, WE WERE LOSING GROUND. Our Fleet was 
growing older, not younger, and we could look forward to decreased budgets-at 
least in buying power. This situation was occurring at the time when we were 
facing a growing SOVIET NAVY and an increasing need to be able to control the sea 
lines of communication. It was obvious, at least in the view of most people, that 
WE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS AT THE SAME OLD STAND. 
The situation that I have just described existed in 1969 when ADMIRAL ZUMWALT 
took over as Chief of Naval Operations. You are all generally familiar with PROJECT 
60-his Program to develop a new roadmap for the Navy, and so I will not go into it 
in detail. However, due to his direction over the past three years the problem has 
come into focus, and A NEW ROADMAP HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. It may not be to the liking 
of all of us. However, the new drum to which we are now marching is a different one 
from that we had before; but it is sound and realistic and based on the current 
facts of life. 
First, we are working hard to put more of our resources into Fleet modernization 
to stop or reverse the growing AGE TREND. Since the overall total dollars available C) 
to the Navy will not be increased sufficiently, we have reduced our operating forces 
to get the money for modernization. We have retired and are retiring many of our 
older ships much earlier than is perhaps desirable and prudent. However, these 
ships are expensive to maintain and operate, both in dollars and manpower, and their 
retirement has allowed us to put more of our available resources into building new 
ships. In essence, WE ARE TAKING A CALCULATED RISK AND MORTGAGING THE PRESENT TO 
INSURE A VIABLE NAVY OF THE FUTURE. 
Second, we have had to re-evaluate the overall composition of our NAVY of the 
future. As I stated, the bulk of our construction programs of the 50's and 60's 
consisted of highly capable, complex and effective ships. These ships were the best 
we could build, and were the equal of any in the world. Unfortunately, they were 
also very expensive. When we looked at our overall requirements for numbers of ships 
to replace those that were reaching the point of no return due to their age and 
decreasing capability, one fact was obvious: WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO BUILD, IN LIGHT 
OF THE FUNDS THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE, ENOUGH EXPENSIVE GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS TO MEET 
OUR TOTAL REQUIREMENTS. 
L 
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There were those who said that since we had fewer numbers we should build each 
one better. This contention obviously put us in the realm of the fictional Fillilou 
Bird. The more expensive, the fewer-with the final result being a Navy which could 
not meet its world wide commitments. 
Thus, it was necessary that we develop a new philosophy for structuring our total 
Navy make up. This philosophy has evolved into one in which we have a sufficient 
number of ships with the highest capability that can operate in the areas of highest 
threat, and these Forces will be complemented by a larger number of less complex, 
but fully mission effective ships capable of operating in the lower threat areas to 
carry out our total world-wide sea control commitments. This philosophy has come to 
be known as the "Hi-Lo Mix". It might be noted here that our concentration on the 
high capability ships during the 50's, 60's and into the early 70's is the fa~~nr that 
allows us now to concentrate largely on the "Lo-Mix" end of the spectrum. 
You are all well aware of the "Lo-Mix" ship Programs-the PF, the Sea Control 
Ship, and the PHM. We can buy 4 or 5 PF's for the price of 1 DLGN; many Sea Control 
Ships for what a new CV would cost. That doesn't mean that we don't need the others; 
but hopefully, for the time being, we can concentrate on getting the numbers. The 
annual operating costs in fuel, manpower, and maintenance funds are similarly a 
fraction of those of their "Hi-Mix" counterparts. 
However, developing the right characteristics for "Lo-Mix" ships has not been 
an easy task. We have had to insure that they had s ufficient capability to carry 
out their missions effectively, but at the same time still be of minimum cost so 
that we procure the requisite numbers-and that's sort of like trying to put too 
much into one bag. The key, of course, is to get the maximum force effectiveness 
within the dollars available. The INDIVIDUAL SHIP MUST ADEQUATELY REFLECT A 
SOLUTION TO THAT PROBLEM. 
How do we go about starting this process, or how have we gone about it? We 
first develop the requirements, and what resources can be devoted to any program, 
through the OSD and CNO Program Planning Guidance/CNO Program Analysis Memorandum 
System. A balance must be struck between the RESOURCES which realistically can be 
expected to be available and the REQUIREMENTS which need to be met, not only for 
shipbuilding, but across the whole Navy spectrum. This Planning Guidance and 
CNO's Program Analysis Memorandum (CPPG/CPAM) System develops the requirements and 
delinates the funds we can affort to spend in each area. Only so much can be spent 
for Strategic, so much for ASW, so much for Amphibious Lift, etc., and of this, 
so much for Aircraft and new ships-Surface Combatants, Submarines, and Support 
Ships. WITHIN THESE LIMITS WE MUST DEFINE OUR SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM. 
Having now determined the Force we need and how much we can spend for ships in 
a given area, we must begin an iterative process between the people in OPNAV and 
those in the Naval Material Command which leads to ship formulation. There has 
to be a close interchange to develop the conceptual alternatives from which we can 
make choices. The problem of getting the most effective ship possible within the 
available funding is one that calls for original and innovative thought from all 
of us on all sides. 
One of the "buzz words" which has come into vogue-I'm not sure it won't haunt 
- us in the future--but which encompasses most of the ideas involved in the formulation 
of our newest Ship Programs, is "Design to Cost"-some people call it "Design to 
Price, and I get saddled with it". In any event, what does "Design to Cost" 
really involve?--What does it really mean? 
First, we must develop the mission of the ship. This mission evolves from 
Force Level Requirements which are produced from the analysis and "tradeoff" 
processes of the CPPG/CPAM System which I just~mentioned. For the lower end of 
of the "Hi-Lo Mix" we have had to strictly limit mission requirements. These 
ships cannot be designed to cover all possible tasks, and we must also take into 
consideration the total Navy mix of ships and aircraft with which any particular 
ship will be operating. 
Characteristics are then developed which will meet the requirements of the stated 
mission. Only those elements essential to this mission can be included, and the 
other "nice to have" characteristics must be removed from consideration. 
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The Material Command develops the alternatives in size, displacement, speed, 
weapons, cost and other features which can be used in the analysis to derive the 
most cost effective ship and to establish our base cost. Numerous iterations will 
occur before the choices are narrowed, and the best suit of characteristics for 
the intended mission and the desired unit cost are established. 
Having done thi~ our real tasks are just beginning. The Naval Constructor 
continually must keep in mind that he is designing to a cost, and that all of his 
considerations in arrangements, specifications, choices of equipment, detailed 
design and production planning must be looked at with a critical eye and with 
innovation from our past practices. He must design and build a ship that provides 
the desired characteristics and yet remains within the cost constraints. This 
whole process is a new challenge-the price and effectiveness of each potential 
"tradeoff" must be weighted to see what its contribution will be to: 1) acquisition 
cost, 2) the life cycle costs of the complete system, 3) the effectiveness of the 
ship, and 4) the other forces traded off to pay for that new system. 
There is an urgent necessity, more than ever before for close coordination of 
all of the facets of shipbuilding and overall Navy planning throughout this process. 
It was recognition of this necessity for a closely coordinated and integrated 
approach that led to the formation last year of OP-97, my office, and PM-18 in 
the Naval Material Command. 
The Sea Control Ship is a current example of how this process works out in 
practice. The basie concept was developed after many studies and analyses, not only 
of the Sea Control Ship concept, but also of its relation to the total Navy Force 
Level. The derived mission stated that it was to provide air support in low threat 
areas for those Forces that were not in company with a Carrier. THAT's A PRETTY 
BROAD STATEMENT, AND OF COURSE IT HAS TO BE NARROWED DOWN; SOMEBODY HAS TO PUT 
LIMITS ON IT. 
The first thing to be accomplished was to develop a Team within OPNAV, the 
Platform Sponsors, the Material Command Technical Experts, the Analysts and others. 
This Group scoped many alternatives to arrive at the basic ship. During this process, 
OPNAV specified the areas to be looked at, while the Material Command gave the 
alternatives, such as numbers of aircraft that could be handled, propulsion system 
available, speed, tonnage, and various costs. The effectiveness of the different 
combinations was analyzed and refinements were proposed. .Additiona1 alternatives 
were provided, and again analyzed. Finally, after many reviews, ship size, performance, 
and cost goals were established by the CNO. Once these were defined, we then had to 
optimize within these limits. Here there were many "tradeoffs" in systems, manning 
arrangements, construction, etc. Again, after numerous reviews by the CNO, the 
final characteristics were established. 
The Sea Control Ship Program is now ~n its final and probably most difficult 
stage-WE MUST MAKE THE SHIP COME TRUE. I am sure that the people who work on it 
know that every day there are continuing additional "tradeoffs". Commonly used 
specifications will have to be reviewed and verified and changed as required. The 
most effective ~rrangements must be chosen, and supporting systems must be appro-
priately selected and designed. During this whole effort some changes in character-
istics may be required, and these have to be factored back-all of this within a 
defined cost constraint. ~ 
Such programs are a direct challenge to the Navy's Shipbuilding Community since 
the required deviation from the old and established well understood practices IS A 
MUST. They require us to look at new materials, new ways of reducing life cycle 
costs and maintenance burdens, constant evaluation of automation, and weighing the 
costs and complexities of automation against the savings in manpower. Maintenance 
procedures must be thoroughly defined in the most efficient manner. 
I must say that the Ship Designer is not the only one concerned with these 
problems. He must be assisted by the Weapons and Combat Systems Engineers, the 
Communication Experts and the OPNAV Community. ALL OF US ARE FACED WITH THE SAME 
CHALLENGE-maximum effectiveness within a realistically defined cost constraint. 
The efforts to date on the PF, the SCS, and the PHM are heartening and show that 
we can sharpen our pencils and do the job. The meeting of this challenge will not 
be easy, BUT IT CAN AND MUST BE DONE. 
.. .' 
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I would like to point out that although I have been speaking of "Design to Cost" 
with reference to the "Low-Mix" end of the spectrum, such as in the PF, it will be 
applicable to all Ship Programs including the future "Hi-Mix" ships which we"must 
go back to in the near future. "Design to Cost" IS, FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, 
THE WAY OF LIFE. 
Finally, there are other complicating factors to be considered other than those 
in our own business. We not only have to satisfy the Navy in doing our job, but 
OSD and Congress are also taking a growing interest in it. You have all probably 
heard of DOD Instructions 5000.1 and 5000.2. These pose additional requirements as 
do the new test and evaluation procedures which are being implemented. The growing 
outside interest in the whole ship procurement process will increase the need for 
us to do our jobs well. We can no longer callout systems which are still on the 
drawing boards. We must evaluate their development risks, key their test and 
evaluation milestones into each Ship Program, and at each step justify our selection 
to OSD and Congress. Out cost estimators must be able to trace in detail their 
estimates, support any changes in these costs, and justify why they have occurred. 
Thus, there will be people looking over our shoulder every step of the way, and 
your knowledge, expertise and professional skills will never have been more challenged 
than in the coming years. 
I have come to know many of you in the NAVSHIP/NAVSEC/NAVMAT Community, and I 
have learned to respect your competence, ability and dedication to build the ships 
that the Navy requires. I know that you will rise to current challenge as you have 
in the past. It is not going to be easy. It will be hard, and there will be many 
frustrations. Every time we push new frontiers and change our way of doing things, 
IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT. However, it is always a challenging but satisfying 
experience. Nevertheless, I would like to state that THE FATE OF THE FUTURE NAVY 
RESTS ON YOUR ABILITY. 
In closing, I am reminded of Winston Churchill's famous speech in the early years 
of World War II when he said: "I have nothing to offer but blood, sweat and tears." 
I think that in the future we are going to have a lot of each, but the end result, I 
am quite sure, will be that we will have a Navy that will be an effective instrument 
of national power as it has to be." 
FEATURE: NAVY SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PROGRESS 
"After a belated start, forced draft Navy missile work to overcome a Soviet lead 
in ship-to-ship missiles is beginning to bear fruit. 
The Navy's missile for the job is known as Harpoon and it will have a range of 
50 to 100 miles. The missile airframe is already in flight test including underwater 
launches from torpedo tubes by the prime contractor McDonnell Douglas. Surface 
launchers will be the same as those now 'used for the 3-T and Standard surface-to-air 
missiles and the ASROC ASW weapon. The latest test milestone was an excellent rating 
given to Honeywell's AN/APN-194 radar altimeter, which positions the missile at wave-
skimming heights where it is difficult to spot and shoot down. Tests were at the Point 
Mugu, Calif. Naval Air Systems Pacific Test Range from both an airborne and shore-based 
launcher. 
With an operational Harpoon still some years away, the Navy has been driving hard 
on development of an "Interim Harpoon" with an operational capability achievable in 
much less time. The solution was a "quick fix" to the Navy's standard surface-to-air 
missile, 50,000 of which have been built by General Dynamics Pomona Division. Work 
began in 1971 and recently culminated in a successful test firing from USS HOEL, with 
the missile's own active radar seeking out the target ship, the DE ex-INGERSOLL, 
and hitting it. Known as Standard Active, the missile is ten inches longer and 100 
pounds heavier than Standard-I. The additional space and weight accommodates an 
advanced guidance section of a seeker head, radome, shroud, logic and control 
assemblies, and a guidance computer. Heart of the system is a Paytheon coherent 
monopulse doppler radar. The 25-mile missile can be fired with a minimum modification 
to existing shipboard launch systems from DDGs, DEGs, and DLGs. It can also be fired 
from single-round deck-mounted cannisters on smaller ships and craft. 
Harpoon will be a cruise missile, air breathing driven by a small turbojet engine. 
But with the readily available techology used for early development it will have a 
limited range. With the higher technology in both engine and warhead in prospect a 
much onger ranged cruise missile is possible with only a small increase in size over 
Harpoon. This is the Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) yet to be dubbed with 
a nickname ("Triad to Become Quadrate?" AFJ Dec. 1972). 
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The SCLM is expected to have a range of several hundred miles which would enable 
a submarine to lie submerged off an enemy coast and launch the surface-skimming 
missiles under his radar screen against targets far inland. Soviet subs now have 
this capability, which has caused the United States to erect a radar screen along 
the coasts and to base SAC's bombers deep in the hinterland. The SLCM would cause 
the Soviets to do the same at some expense and would provide our SALT negotiators 
a bargaining point. Technical feasibility of the launch method has been verified 
by underwater tests, and developmental work is going forward." 
Courtesy of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL July 1973. 
EDITORIAL: BASE SECURITY PROBLEMS 
A recent anonymous student complaint directed at the security guards' checking 
of ID cards in Bldgs. 233 and 234 at night prompted this EDITOR to investigate the 
situation. In a discussion with LCDR De Lashmitt, the Base Security Officer, the 
following details were revealed: 
*The only times that the ID cards were checked in these buildings was at 
2200 each night, since at that time all personnel should be out of these 
buildings (NPSINST 5000.4 para 207). 
*The reason for concern in maintaining security in these specific buildings 
is the valuable engineering equipment contained within for student use. A 
recent inventory of this equipment revealed a list of unaccounted items 
totaling thousands of dollars. 
*Security guards had always found doors and windows open and no one in the 
building when making their rounds several hours after the ten o'clock 
close up. . 
Thus in order to ensure the security of valuable equipment the security guards 
were directed to courteously approach the students in the building and make a list 
.. . -0\ 
of those present in the event a problem should occur later in the evening. Curricular 
officers of the students listed would then be informed if the building were found 
open during later checks. 
The obvious point to be made here is that student cooperation is necessary in 
this matter to enable those who feel the need to work late on research projects, etc. 
However, continued abuse (leaving doors an~ windows open after 2200) will ultimately 
result in loss of the use of these facilities after hours. Those who claim an 
"intrusion of privacy and thought" as "Mister Anonymous" did may be doing their 
studying at home each night • 
. . 
